Hybrid bonds are a form of deeply subordinated, perpetual or very long-dated debt with equity-like features, often treated as 50% equity and 50% debt by rating agencies. For a company like Ørsted, several factors are relevant:

1. **Hybrid capital already in use**: As of end-2022, Ørsted has hybrid capital of DKK 19.8 billion, representing roughly 20.7% of total equity of DKK 95.5 billion, and around 9% of total capital (equity + hybrids + net debt). They have been actively issuing and repurchasing hybrids.

2. **Business profile and cash flows**: Ørsted is a regulated / contracted renewable energy utility with fairly stable EBITDA. High leverage capacity is there, albeit with large capex needs. Their EBITDA interest coverage is healthy but declining due to rising rates and impairment risks.

3. **Credit rating concerns**: Rating agencies cap equity credit for hybrids (typically around 15-25% of total adjusted capital). Too high a reliance can lead to rating pressure, which is undesirable for a capital-intensive developer reliant on cheap funding.

4. **Market conditions in 2022**: Interest rates and spreads have risen sharply (swap rates moved from negative to ~2%, IG corporate bond yields widened). This makes issuing new hybrids more expensive compared to 2020-2021. Over-reliance would push up the average cost of capital.

5. **Current hybrid proportion**: The hybrid component is already material; maintaining it close to the maximum allowed equity credit range is sensible, but significantly increasing it would be credit-negative and expensive.

Considering that Ørsted’s hybrid capital already constitutes around 20-25% of total equity + hybrids, a target reliance of around **25%** of total capital structure seems appropriate — enough to get equity credit and support ratings, but not so much as to alarm credit markets or raise funding costs excessively.

<answer>25%</answer>